# Does 401(k) loan repayment crowd out retirement saving? Evidence and implications for plan design 

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PRC 2024 Symposium
May 3, 2024

## Motivation

- Building emergency savings is a challenge for American households
- Fed survey: $37 \%$ of adults could not cover an unexpected $\$ 400$ expense in cash
- SECURE 2.0 makes it easier to use 401(k) assets for short-term expenses
- PLESAs
- Penalty-free $\$ 1,000$ emergency withdrawals
- Focus on the emergency withdrawal provision because it is simpler and more likely to be taken up by employers


## Emergency withdrawals

- Essentially a penalty-free and dollar-capped version of hardship withdrawals
- Up to \$1,000 per year
- No $10 \%$ penalty
- Self-certification of financial need
- Provides obvious liquidity value and could encourage more 401(k) saving
- But annual \$1,000 withdrawals could cause substantial leakage
- How can plan sponsors offer liquidity value while minimizing long-run costs to retirement wealth?


## Automatic repayment

- Proposal: automatic repayment
- We study the feasibility of automatic repayment by analyzing the behavior of participants taking 401(k) loans
- Repayment occurs through mandatory payroll deferrals; default during employment is rare
- Elective contributions are remarkably stable during repayment: loan takers' contribution rates fall only by 0.8 pp relative to a control group
- EW takers would likely show a similar capacity to repay withdrawals while maintaining their elective contributions
- Most EW takers could repay a $\$ 1,000$ withdrawal within $12-18$ months via a 2 pp increase in their elective contribution rate


## Caveats

- Need to assume that participants taking small 401(k) loans are similar to future emergency withdrawal takers
- Cannot observe financial behavior outside the 401(k) plan
- Any automatic repayment policy would need to address technical considerations (recordkeeping plumbing, matching and gaming incentives, etc.)


## Data

- Administrative recordkeeping data from Vanguard
- Analyze participants with loan issuances in 2021
- Ensures two years of post-issuance history
- Obtain similar results in 2017 pre-pandemic sample
- Supplementary analysis of participants taking hardship withdrawals during the same 2017 and 2021 periods


## Summary statistics

|  | Loan issuances | Hardship withdrawals |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Median age | 42 | 41 |
| Median plan tenure | 5 | 5 |
| Estimated income |  |  |
| 10th | 26,320 | 22,120 |
| 25th | 40,229 | 34,992 |
| Median | 56,689 | 51,257 |
| 75th | 87,098 | 73,457 |
| 90th | 125,769 | 103,593 |
| Loan/HW amount |  |  |
| 10th | 1,419 | 665 |
| 25th | 2,988 | 1,296 |
| Median | 7,021 | 2,985 |
| 75th | 17,000 | 7,000 |
| 90th | 30,000 | 17,627 |
| Number of participants | 253,300 | 72,118 |

## Elective contributions are stable during repayment of small loans



## Control group

Now compare loan takers to a control group:

- Same plan
- Same tenure
- Absolute age difference of 5 years or less
- Absolute income difference of $25 \%$ or less
- No loans or HWs in the six months before the relevant loan issuance
- Same elective contribution rate six months before the relevant loan issuance


## Small contribution crowd-out relative to the control group (all loans)



## Contribution crowd-out by loan size



## Contribution crowd-out by income



## HW takers have stable contributions when not subject to suspensions

(a) 2017 sample

(b) 2021 sample


## Repayment timelines

- Preceding results suggest that emergency withdrawal takers would be able to repay the withdrawal amount while maintaining their elective contributions
- What should the repayment timeline be? Take guidance from loans $\leq \$ 1,000$ :
- Most repaid within 12-18 months
- Given income distribution of participants taking small loans, achievable with a 2 pp increase in the elective contribution rate


## Most loans for $\$ 1,000$ or less are repaid within 12-18 months



## A contribution increase of 2 pp would suffice for most participants



## Conclusion

- Emergency withdrawals newly permitted under SECURE 2.0 are a flexible liquidity option but raise the risk of costly retirement saving leakage
- We propose an "automatic repayment" policy in which plan sponsors encourage or default participants into repaying these withdrawals
- The stability of contribution rates during 401(k) loan repayment suggests that most withdrawal takers could repay while maintaining their prior elective contributions
- More generally, stable contribution behavior of loan takers could be seen as revealing "excess" saving capacity among 401(k) participants

