# Would Baby Bonds Reduce Racial Inequality in Retirement Wealth? 

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## Two wealth inequality problems



## Wealth provides stability, growth, and power

Hard to save while poor, despite existing incentives

- 529s depend on parental participation, regressive tax breaks
- Individual Development Accounts are difficult to stick to

Baby Bonds designed to redress these issues (Hamilton and Darity 2010)

- Federally funded, progressively seeded, \$500 to \$50,000
- Parents and kids cannot access until early adulthood
- Universal and feasible total cost of $\$ 80$ billion


## Could the program make headway on big wealth issues?

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Longitudinal wealth data from birth through Young adulthood

- Young Adults in 2015 PSID, ages 18-25
- Household net worth at birth and in 2015
- Match to 1989 wave if born between ' 89 and ' 91,1994 wave for '92-'96
- All inflated to 2015 USD (Zewde 2020)


## Progressive Distribution of funds

- Assigned categorical values by quintiles of wealth
- Smoothed out discrete values by regressing on IHS-transformed wealth
- $\log ($ birthwealth + sqrt(birthwealth^2 +1 ))


## IHS: similar to log, but allows negatives



## More progressive than a linear regression



## Universal Baby Bonds Reduce Median Racial Wealth Gap

m Current Wealth

\$100,000

White-Black Wealth Ratio at the Median 2015 baseline: 15.9

## Universal Baby Bonds Reduce Median

 Racial Wealth Gap

## White

Black
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## Greater Wealth Increase at Bottom and Middle



## What will then happen over the life course?

- Would we observe an impact 5, 10, 40 years later?


## Inequality tends to widen over life course

- Cumulative Dis/Advantage: Individuals or cohorts grow further apart with time
- Dubbed the Matthew Effect (Merton 1968)
- Attenuated by equitable institutions (Zewde \& Crystal 2022)


## Even small early differences



Can generate large differences over the life course

Long term observable impact requires at least:

1. Enough to invest in something
2. Consistent returns to investments
(1) Smaller early differences

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(2) Not more divergent than narrowing in (1)

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Not likely for a policy of cash infusion to only affect differential returns

## How might existing iterations affect future trajectories?

- \$500 | \$16,000 | \$25,000 towards school, a home, a business, or retirement


## Pennsylvania

- Passed | Universal eligibility | \$500 max | Higher-ed


## Connecticut

- Paused | Medicaid eligibility | $\$ 16,000$ | 4 choices for use


## Washington, DC

- Passed | Medicaid, income up to $300 \%$ FPL | $\$ 25,000$ max | 4 choices for use


## Higher ed tuition and fees

- \$500 won't go far
- 4 years at CSU campuses approximately \$50k (enough for Assoc deg)
- 4 years at UDC costs about \$25k, could cover this


## Buying a home

- CT: need \$12,400 down (median home \$355k)
- DC: need \$26,740 down (median home \$764k)


## First requirement within reach (not in PA)

- Enough to invest in some potentially appreciating assets
- Main threat is tuition and home price inflation outpacing Baby Bond accounts


## Potential disparities in capacity to avoid consumption

- Say you need a life saving kidney transplant
- May withdraw early from IRA, or sell or refinance home in a couple of years


## Potentially disparate investment vehicles

- If you already have down payment help, you can invest in financial assets
- Portfolio composition key driver of intergenerational correlation in wealth (Charles \& Hurst 2003; Boulware \& Kuttner 2020)

Potentially disparate returns to the same investment

- Racially disparate rates of home appreciation, returns to ed


## Inconsistent returns likely, but hard to specify without a huge pilot

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Table 2
Effect of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Exposure on Education and Employment Outcomes (Reduced Form)

| Can look to EITC |  | Dependent Variable |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| But small amounts relative to household needs, |  | High School Graduate; Mean = .92 (1) | At Least Some College; Mean $=.52$ <br> (2) | College Graduate Mean = . 31 <br> (3) | Highest Grade Completed; Mean $=13.7$ <br> (4) | Employed; Mean = . 817 (5) | Earnings (2013\$); Mean = 25,391 (6) |
| Little evidence of savings or investment | EITC exposure between ages 0 and 5 | $\begin{gathered} -.005 \\ (.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -.000 \\ (.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -.007 \\ (.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -.024 \\ (.071) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .021 \\ (.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 646.1 \\ (818.3) \end{gathered}$ |
| (Smeeding, Phillips, \& O'Connor 2000) | EITC exposure between ages 6 and 12 | $\begin{gathered} -.003 \\ (.003) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .002 \\ (.005) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .009 \\ (.006) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} .008 \\ (.022) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -.002 \\ (.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 42.4 \\ (415.1) \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
|  | EITC exposure between ages 13 and 18 | $\begin{aligned} & .012 * \% \% \\ & (.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} .006 \\ (.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .013 * * \\ & (.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & .081 * * * \\ & (.025) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} .008^{*} \\ (.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 564.0 \% \% \\ & (244.9) \end{aligned}$ |

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## Baby Bonds improve net worth position for young adults

- Disproportionately for Black and low-wealth populations
- Expanded capability to own appreciating assets
- Potentially higher appreciation rates for the most well-off recipients
- At the extreme could increase inequality at retirement


## Policies that narrow divergence also those that increase equity broadly

- Maintain affordability of society's building blocks: ed, homes, healthcare
- Increase impact of any working-age intervention on late-life wealth


## Parsimonious direct approach: pair Baby Bonds with programs aimed squarely at retirement

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