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ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

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Recap

- Pensions and ESG: Institutional and Historical Perspective (P. Brett Hammond, Capital Group & Amy O'Brien, Nuveen, a TIAA Company)
 - Diverse and dynamic history of meanings, motives and players
 - Externalities, universal owners, stakeholder theory, ESG factors & data
 - As interest broadens, do we need more alignment? How to achieve?
- What Does ESG Investing Really Mean? Measuring Materiality (Linda-Eling Lee, MSCI)
 - Disagreement among ESG data derive from different motives not quality (aka effectiveness or confusion)
 - However, data do have issues in reliance on voluntary unaudited disclosure, media, alternative sources and imputation
 - MSCI "rating" with proprietary dynamic industry-specific weighting have predictive power for different outcomes over different time horizons
 - Cash flow
 - Idiosyncratic risks
 - Systemic risks



The Motivation for Both Papers


- Despite the growing investor interest in ESG, there remains a nagging sense of excess hype or a fad that is ahead of reality
 - What to measure? Values or value?
 - How to measure? Voluntary unaudited corporate reports vs. media and other alternative data (with imputation)?
 - How strong are the correlations to financial performance out of sample (i.e., do ESG funds outperform over the long-term)?
 - Consistent with fiduciary duty?
- Academic studies including those presented here trail practice
 - Rely on MSCI-KLD data (not same as MSCI)
 - Values > Value.
 - Voluntary corporate reporting > media or alternative data
 - Broadly supportive of win-win but not convincing to skeptics
 - Short time periods
 - Non-transparent
 - Inconsistent assumptions



Placing Both Papers in Context

- Diverse and dynamic history of meanings, motives and players
 - Religiously motivated screening: values and risk mitigation vs. tracking error.
 But, does divestment actually have impact? Only under select conditions.
 - Engagement of CALSTRS, NYC Pensions, UNPRI, Coalition for Good
 Governance and others shown to drive impact and value but at a cost in fees
 - Portfolio optimization, tilting and factor models and progress in ESG integration dependent upon a high quality independent ESG data signal
- What holds us back from realizing promise of reported investor interest in ESG?
 - Industry-wide pressure for low fees privileges exclusions and simple extensions of existing strategies using off-the-shelf data
 - Institutional Investors perspectives on ESG investing evolving but still hesitant
 - Disagreement in motives underlying data
 - MSCI-KLD focused on scoring companies for alignment with values of "just and sustainable world" followed by Sustainalytics, ASSET4, Vigeo-Eiris ...
 - Innovest's EcoValue and subsequent extensions focused on material impact of ESG on intangible asset valuation. RobecoSAM followed
 - TruValue Labs and others focus on media-reported stakeholder opinions
 - As interest in value > values, industry-specific materiality screens what of PENNSYLVANIA layered on top of discordant data providing improvements in fit UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA


Fees Trending Downwards Overall & Relative to Benchmarks






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Active Share of ESG ETFs & Mutual Funds



Source: Morningstar






Ineffective Exclusions Gaining on More Effective Engagement Strategies




Low Fee ESG Funds Gain Share (of AUM) in 2018-2020



■ High ■ Medium ■ Low





Average AUM of all ESG funds with low fees, 2007-2020






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
Reasons Why Majority of U.S. Institutional Investors Still Have Not Incorporated ESG Factors

Source: Callen Group



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Rationale for Incorporation of ESG Factors by US Institutional Investors



Source: Callen Group



	High Fee	Med Fee	Low Fee
Financial Performance (relative to benchmark)	-0.004	-0.006	-0.003
ESG Performance (relative to benchmark), TruValue Labs	0.325	1.060	-0.086
Change in ESG Performance (relative to benchmark),			
TruValue Labs	0.026	0.028	0.016
Due to stock purchases and sales	0.030	0.017	0.007
Due to changes in stock's held	-0.004	0.011	0.009

Note: Statistics shown are the quarterly medians across all funds in the fee category, 2007-2020 Q2


Source: Chuah, Kevin, Witold Henisz & James McGlinch (2021) "Greenwash or Green: What Attracts Inflows into ESG Equity Funds?"





Recent Critique of Khan, Serafiem & Yoon (2016)

Figure 1: Final Space for Model Uncertainty Analysis



*We attempt to replicate part of KSY's mapping based on information in their publication.

******Because we have only KSY's actual measure, we cannot observe the mappings used to create it. Thus, its individual elements cannot be combined with other mapping assumptions.

⁺Previous year's annual returns, size, BTM, turnover, roe, analyst coverage, R&D, advertising intensity, SG&A, capital expenditure, leverage.

Source: Luca Berchicci and Andrew King (2021) "Corporate Sustainability: A Model Uncertainty Analysis of Materiality"


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Recent Critique of Khan, Serafiem & Yoon (2016)

Figure 2: Marginal Effects at Average - All Models



Estimates for the effect on stock return for all models and measures of material sustainability. Units are percent per month, so a value of one (1.0) represents a return of 0.01 per month for each of 12 months. Over the full collection of models, 54% of the coefficient estimates are positive and 46% negative; 80% of the estimates imply annualized returns less than +/-2%/year and 60% of the results imply annualized returns less than +/-1% per year. 4.0% of the models result an estimate of a positive coefficient with a 95% confidence interval not inclusive of zero; 4.5% of models result an estimate of a negative coefficient with a 95% confidence interval not inclusive of zero.

A red line shows our replication of KSY's estimate using their binary measure, MatSust(ortho, topquint), but our sample and other data.

Source: Luca Berchicci and Andrew King (2021) "Corporate Sustainability: A Model Uncertainty Analysis of Materiality"

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What's Missing (and Desperately Needed)

- Third party validation of proprietary data including choices of assumptions, weighting, time horizons and imputation protocols
- Analyses that uses that data to show which ESG investments for which firms pay over what time horizon via what mechanism <u>AND</u> which destroy value
 - Top-line revenue growth
 - Cost reductions (including regulatory and legal interventions)
 - Productivity uplift
 - Idiosyncratic risks
 - Systematic risks
- Analyses that examine contingencies and moderators to these relationships
 - Individual investor demand
 - Asset manager incentives and engagement including proxy voting
 - Stakeholder interest (in an issue for a firm)
 - Availability of technological options for ESG issue
 - Existence of anti-competitive barriers in industry
 - Corporate (enterprise risk) management



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The ESG Analytics Lab leverages Wharton's demonstrated expertise in analytics to develop high-quality, replicable academic research and pedagogy resulting in insights that can help current and future investors, asset managers and other ESG integrators make informed decisions.

https://analytics.wharton.upenn.edu/esg-analytics-lab/



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