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The Future of Public Employee Retirement Systems
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Boettner Center for Pensions and Retirement Research

Reform Paths for Public Plan

Discussant Comments

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Reform Paths for Public Plans Discussant Comments

- Defined Contribution (DC) Plans in Public Sector – Best Practice Benchmark
 - Brief Comments
- Improving Cost Effectiveness of Defined Benefit (DB) Retirement Plans
 - General Comments
- Improving Cost Effectiveness of DB Retirement Plans
 - In defense of the “faulty measuring stick”

DC Plans in Public Sector – Best Practice Benchmark – Brief Comments

- Strong emphasis on annuitization – This helps solve major weakness of DC plans
- Good comprehensive “Principles for Effective Core DC Plans”
- Valuable summary of major public DC plans

Improving Cost Effectiveness of DB Retirement Plans – General Comments

- Thorough treatise in support of using “full liability-matching asset portfolio” to meet goal of minimizing contribution volatility and liability volatility
 - for a plan which bases contributions and liability on “market value” liabilities (MVL)
- This approach has value for private sector pension plans
- But this approach undermines public sector pensions

Improving Cost Effectiveness of DB Retirement Plans – Defense of the “faulty measuring stick”

- There are numerous papers supporting a move to reporting of MVL, but these are generally:
 - Focused on corporate pensions, and
 - Rebutted by most public pension actuaries for public pensions
- MVL proponents have the advantage of well-chosen words: Which seems more credible?
 - Actuarial Liability, or
 - Market Value Liability

Between Scylla and Charybdis



Between *Scylla* and *Charybdis*

- *Scylla* characterized as *legislature terminating plan*
- *Charybdis* characterized as: “*the underfunding problem will progressively get worse until the plan falls over of its own weight*”
- Weak evidence that *Charybdis* will occur
 - “Progressively worse underfunding” can be avoided by funding actuarial contribution based on “faulty measuring stick”
- Absent panic, *Scylla* has been successfully avoided

Between *Scylla* and *Charybdis*

- *Scylla* for businesses, is *plan termination*
- *Charybdis* for businesses, is *an earnings surprise or potential reporting of a minimum liability on balance sheet*
 - Financial Accounting Standard 87 (and PPA) require costs/contributions be based on “discount rate” tied to bond rates
 - Volatile and high pension costs can reduce EPS and put strain on stock price
 - Businesses also have bankruptcy risk, where MVL is a relevant calculation



Between Scylla and Charybdis

- This monster and destructive force need not torment the public sector
- Why not?
 1. *Bankruptcy likelihood is extremely low*
 2. *Plans don't terminate under ERISA rules*
 3. *Governments' purpose is not to maximize shareholder value, but to provide services*
 4. *There is no market for governments and government pensions*
- Public pensions not required to utilize “market value” liabilities

More appropriate Greek mythological analogies

- Pandora's Box
- Trojan Horse
- Nemesis

Pandora's Box



Reporting MVL could open Pandora's Box

I. MVL measurement and disclosure

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- I. MVL measurement and disclosure
- II. Plan costs measured using MVL

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- IX. Individuals also shift from equities to bonds

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- VIII. Push to Defined Contribution (DC) plans
- IX. Individuals also shift from equities to bonds
- X. Equities continue to drop in downward spiral

Trojan Horse





Trojan Horse

- What seems like a more effective approach to funding public Defined Benefit plans is only more effective if public plans are required to report costs and liabilities using bond rates
- If we continue on the “faulty” measuring stick, public plans can invest in equities and reap the reward of the higher returns, saving taxpayers money in the long run

Nemesis





“Market Value” Liabilities is the Nemesis of Public DB plans

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- Nemesis is related to other concepts:
 - Liability driven investing
 - Financial economics (the pension subset)
 - “Economic” cost or value
 - “True” cost or value
 - “Transparency”
 - “Mark to Market”
 - “Moral Hazard”

There are weaknesses in the current approach, but they are not cured by “market value” liabilities

- Current “faulty” approach if used alone does not reflect risk of not earning actuarial expected return
- This can lead to incomplete understanding of:
 - Surplus or Unfunded Liability
 - Cost of improving benefits
 - Strategic “bets” such as Pension Obligation Bonds

Instead of “market value” liabilities, utilize other approaches

- Look at actuarial values using multiple rates of investment return
 - This could include bond rates
- Stress tests
- Sensitivity analysis
- Stochastic simulation
- Risk of ruin
- Forecast actuarial values using alternate rates of investment returns
- Asset-Liability forecasts
- What-if scenarios based on key plan objectives

Questions? Comments?



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