



# Adopting Hybrid Pension Plans

## Effects of Economic Crisis and Regulatory Reform

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# History of Hybrid Plans

- The first hybrid plan was adopted by Bank of America in 1985
- Through the 1990s, there was a surge of hybrid plan adoptions
- Motivations for adopting hybrid plans
  - Changing accounting rules
  - Increasing preferences for more mobile pensions
  - Shifts in compensation packages that reduced dollars allocated to retirement plans
  - Overfunded status of some traditional plans

# New Millennium Brought Shift in How Employers Viewed Hybrid Pensions

- Law suits began to emerge around the turn of the century
  - Transition methods used by some conversions called “wear-away” were accused of violating age discrimination laws and policy
- The uncertainty of the legal status of these plans resulted in a sharp decline in plan conversions between 2004 and 2006.
  - Recently, in the courts and the legislature, most charges have been dismissed or resolved
- Passing of the Pension Protection Act of 2006
  - New law provided an age discrimination safe harbor for hybrid plans encompassing essentially all existing designs
  - Essentially legalized all hybrid plans

## Then Came the 2007 Economic Recession

- The sharp decline in the value of pension assets due to the recession became the primary disincentive for sponsoring pensions
- However, there were a number of hybrid plan adoptions, albeit smaller than in the 1990s, by plan sponsors who still wanted to offer a “DB+DC” retirement plan design
  - Offering hybrid plans allows plan sponsors to continue offering a benefit that did not fluctuate like benefits from DC plans
  - The investment risk of offering a hybrid plan versus a traditional DB plan is lower for the plan sponsor

## Adopting Hybrid Plans from 2000-2009

- Due to the legal battles, regulatory reform, and the 2007 economic recession, growth of hybrid plans in the last decade has fluctuated
- To identify the determinants for converting to a hybrid plan in the last decade we perform analyses using two data sources
  - Form 5500 data files for years 2000-2007
  - Towers Watson's Fortune 1000 pension finance data for fiscal years 2000-2009

# Form 5500 Non-Frozen Pensions Sponsored by Fortune 1000 Companies

<b>Plan Year</b>	<b>Number of Hybrid Plans</b>	<b>Hybrid Plans as a Percentage of DB Plans</b>	<b>Active Participants in Hybrid Plans as Percentage of Active Participants in DB Plans</b>	<b>Assets in Hybrid Plans as Percentage of Assets in DB Plans</b>
<b>2000</b>	134	13%	27%	31%
<b>2001</b>	126	13%	25%	30%
<b>2002</b>	163	17%	29%	34%
<b>2003</b>	192	19%	36%	37%
<b>2004</b>	189	20%	39%	39%
<b>2005</b>	207	23%	42%	40%
<b>2006</b>	185	23%	40%	39%
<b>2007</b>	195	25%	46%	44%

Note: We identified Form 5500 pensions using Employer Identification Numbers and Name identification. We found over 80% of Fortune 1000 companies in the Form 5500 data

# Pension Plan Conversions by Year for Fortune 1000 Companies

<b>Year</b>	<b>Continuing Sponsoring Traditional DB Plan (Active or Closed DB Plan)</b>	<b>Converted to Hybrid Plan</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>2000 to 2001</b>	433	18	451
<b>2001 to 2002</b>	414	12	426
<b>2002 to 2003</b>	395	11	406
<b>2003 to 2004</b>	347	1	348
<b>2004 to 2005</b>	313	1	314
<b>2005 to 2006</b>	308	1	309
<b>2006 to 2007</b>	288	5	293
<b>2007 to 2008</b>	232	8	240
<b>2008 to 2009</b>	219	2	221
<b>Total</b>	2949	59	3008

Note: We identified a conversion for a Fortune 1000 company when at least one of their plans converted to a hybrid plan

# Logit Regression Results for Fortune 1000 Companies including Plan Information from Form 5500, 2000-2007

	First Regression		Second Regression		Third Regression	
	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error
<b>Intercept</b>	-4.367*	2.411*	-8.033***	2.738***	-9.424***	3.055***
<b>Weighted average funding level</b>	-0.667	0.727	0.341	0.685	0.520	0.633
<b>Weighted average actives/retirees</b>	-0.0006	0.004	-0.0003	0.003	-0.00007	0.003
<b>At least one plan is collectively bargained indicator</b>	0.557***	0.1561***	0.549***	0.161***	0.554***	0.169***
<b>Weighted average total participants per plan</b>	0.000004	0.000002	-0.000004*	0.000002*	-0.000005**	0.000002**
<b>Logarithm of average of plan assets</b>	0.197	0.136	0.272*	0.140*	0.280*	0.147*
<b>Offer 3 plans or more indicator</b>	0.238	0.270	2.872*	0.276*	0.223	0.279
<b>PBO/market value</b>	2.129***	0.408***	1.867***	0.428***	1.985***	0.440***
<b>(Total pension assets-PBO)/market value</b>	3.790***	1.420***	2.872*	1.486*	3.076*	1.514*
<b>EPS</b>	0.00003	0.0002	-0.00005	0.0002	-0.00005	0.0002
<b>Logarithm of market value</b>	-0.222*	0.123*	-0.255**	0.123**	-0.209	0.130
<b>Year dummy variables</b>	No		Yes		Yes	
<b>Industry dummy variables</b>	No		No		Yes	
<b>-2 Log L</b>	588.706		558.984		546.701	



# Conclusions

- Large company conversions do not appear to be driven by the funded status of the individual plans they sponsor
- Rather, the overall financial health of the company and the overall size and overall health of all of the plans they sponsor appear to be motivating companies to convert to a hybrid plan
  - It seems that companies that have a smaller market capitalization and large pension benefit obligations and pension assets relative to their market capitalization were more likely to convert
  - It seems that when companies were not doing well relative to their peers, changing their pension plan design was more likely, perhaps in an effort to reduce costs

# Policy Implications

- Implications of the current regulatory process
- What we expect to see in the next 5-10 years